Friday, March 16, 200
4:00 p.m.
IMBS Conference Room Social Sciences Plaza-A, SSPA
2112
"Events, Periods, and Institutions in Historians' Language." History and Theory (1967), 6(2):159-179.
(with Richmond H. Thomason.) "Abstraction in First-Order Model Logic." Theoria (1968), 34(3):203-207.
(with Richmond H. Thomason.) "Modality and Reference." Noûs (November 1968), 2(4):359-372.
"A Theory of Conditionals." In Nicholas Rescher, ed., Studies in Logical Theory, pp. 98-112. American Philosophical Quarterly Monograph Series, 2. Oxford: Blackwell, 1968.
"Wallace on Propositional Attitudes." Journal of Philosophy (November 20, 1969), 66(22):803-806.
"Pragmatics." Synthese (December 1970), 22(1-2):272-289.
"Probability and Conditionals." Philosophy of Science (March 1970), 37(1):64-80.
(with Richmond H. Thomason.) "A Semantic Analysis of Conditional Logic." Theoria (1970), 36(1):23-42.
"Pragmatics." In Donald Davidson and Gilbert Herman, eds., Semantics of Natural Language, pp. 380-397. 2d ed. Synthese Library. Dordrecht & Boston: D. Reidel, 1972.
Review of Jaakko Hintikka's Models for Modalities. Journal of Philosophy (August 17, 1972), 69(15):456-460.
"Presuppositions." Journal of Philosophical Logic (October 1973), 2(4):447-456.
(with Richmond H. Thomason.) "A Semantic Theory of Adverbs." Linguistic Inquiry (Spring 1973), 4(2):195-200.
Review of Alan Ryan's The Philosophy of the Social Sciences. Philosophical Review (January 1973), 81(1):126-128.
"Tenses and Pronouns." Journal of Philosophy (October 1973), 70(18):610-612.
Review of Ernest Adams' "The Logic of Conditionals," Ernest Adams, Jaakko Hintikka, and Patrick Suppes' "Proabability and the Logic of Conditionals." Journal of Symbolic Logic (September 1974), 39(3):609-611.
"Indicative Conditionals." Philosophia (1975), 5(3):269-286.
"Indicative Conditionals." In Asa Kasher, ed., Language in Focus: Foundations, Methods, and Systems: Essays in Memory of Yehoshua Bar-Hillel. Synthese Library, 89. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science (1976), 43. Dordrecht & Boston : D. Reidel, 1976.
"Letter by Stalnaker to van Fraassen."
In William L. Harper and C.A. Hooker, eds., Foundations of
Probability Theory, Statistical Inference, and Statistical Theories of
Science, Vol. I: Foundations and Philosophy of Epistemic Applications
of Probability Theory, pp. 302-306. The University of
Western Ontario Series in Philosophy of Science (1976), 6.
Dordrecht, Holland; Boston: D. Reidel, 1976.
On Bas C. van Fraassen's
"Probabilities of Conditionals," pp. 261-300. Followed by
"Letter by van Fraassen to Stalnaker," pp. 307-308.
"Letter" to William L. Harper.
In William L. Harper and C.A. Hooker, eds., Foundations of
Probability Theory, Statistical Inference, and Statistical Theories of
Science, Vol. I: Foundations and Philosophy of Epistemic Applications
of Probability Theory, pp. 113-115. The University of
Western Ontario Series in Philosophy of Science (1976), 6.
Dordrecht, Holland; Boston: D. Reidel, 1976.
On Harper's "Rational Belief Change,
Popper Functions and Counterfactuals," pp. 73-112. Followed by Harper's
"Ramsey Test Conditionals and Iterated Belief Change (A Response to
Stalnaker)," pp. 117-135.
"Possible Worlds."
Nous (March 1976), 10(1):65-75.
Commentators: John Pollock and John
Wallace.
"Propositions." In Alfred F. MacKay and Daniel D. Merrill, eds., Issues in the Philosophy of Language: Proceedings of the 1972 Oberlin Colloquium in Philosophy, pp. 79-91. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1976.
"Complex Predicates." Monist (July 1977), 60(3):327-339.
"Assertion." In Peter Cole, ed., Pragmatics, pp. 315-332. Syntax and Semantics, 9. New York: Academic Press, 1978.
"Anti-Essentialism." Midwest Studies in Philosophy (1979), 4:343-355.
Review of Gerald Gazdar's Pragmatics: Implicature, Presupposition and Logical Form. Language (1980), 56(4):902-905.
Edited (with William L. Harper and Glenn Pearce.)
IFs: Conditionals, Belief, Decision, Chance, and Time.
University of Western Ontario Series in Philosophy of Science,
15.
Dordrecht & Boston: Reidel, 1981.
Includes by Robert Stalnaker: "A Theory
of Conditionals," pp. 41-55; "A Defense of Conditional Excluded Middle,"
pp. 87-104; "Probability and Conditionals," pp. 107-128; "Letter to David
Lewis, May 21, 1972," pp. 151-152; "Indicative Conditionals," pp. 193-210.
"Indexical Belief." Synthese (1981), 57:129-152.
Inquiry. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, "A Bradford Book," 1984.
"Counterparts and Identity." Midwest Studies in Philosophy (1986), 11:121-140.
"Possible Worlds and Situations." Journal of Philosophical Logic (February 1986), 15(1):109-123.
"Replies to Schiffer's 'Stalnaker's Problem of Intentionality' and Field's 'Stalnaker on Intentionality'." Pacific Philosophical Quarterly (April 1986), 67(2):113-123.
Inquiry. 1st MIT pbk. ed. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, A Bradford Book, 1987.
"Semantics for Belief." Philosophical Topics (1987), 15:177-190.
"Belief Attribution and Context."
In Robert H. Grimm and Daniel D. Merrill, eds.,
Contents of Thought, pp. 156-181. Series: Arizona Colloquium in
Cognition.
Proceedings of the 1985 Oberlin Colloquium in Philosophy.
Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1988.
Followed by comments by Hans Kamp, pp.
156-181.
"Possible Worlds and Situations." In Jack Kulas, James H. Fetzer, and Terry L. Rankin, eds., Philosophy, Language, and Artificial Intelligence: Resources for Processing Natural Language. Studies in Cognitive Systems. Dordrecht & Boston: Kluwer, 1988.
Review of David Lewis' On the Plurality of Worlds. Mind (January 1988), 97(385):116-128.
"Vague Identity." In David F. Austin, ed., Philosophical Analysis, pp. 349-360. Norwell: Kluwer, 1988.
"On Grandy on Grice." Journal of Philosophy (October 1989), 86(10):526-527.
"On What's in the Head." In James E. Tomberlin, ed., Philosophical Perspectives, 3: Philosophy of Mind and Action Theory, 1989, pp. 287-316. Atascadero: Ridgeview, 1989.
"Mental Content and Linguistic Form." Philosophical Studies (January-February 1990), 58(1-2):129-146.
"Narrow Content." In C. Anthony Anderson and Joseph Owens, eds., Propositional Attitudes: The Role of Content in Logic, Language, and Mind. CSLI Lecture Notes, No. 20. Stanford: CSLI, 1990.
"Pragmatics." In A.P. Martinich, ed., The Philosophy of Language. 2nd ed. New York: Oxford University Press, 1990.
"How to Do Semantics for the Language of Thought." In Barry Loewer and Georges Rey, eds., Meaning in Mind: Fodor and his Critics. Philosophers and their Critics, 3. Cambridge, MA & Oxford: Blackwell, 1991.
"The Problem of Logical Omniscience, I." Synthese (December 1991), 89(3):425-440.
"Propositions." In Jay L. Garfield & Murray Kiteley, eds., Meaning and Truth: Essential Readings in Modern Semantics. Paragon Issues in Philosophy. New York: Paragon House, 1991.
Review of Hilary Putnam's Representation and Reality. Philosophical Review (April 1992), 101(2):359-362.
"A Note on Non-Monotonic Modal Logic." Artificial Intelligence (December 1993), 64(2):183-196.
"Twin Earth Revisited." Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (1993), 93:297-311.
"What is the Representation Theory of Thinking? A Comment on William G. Lycan." Mind and Language (1993), 8(3):423-430.
(with Richard Jeffrey.) "Conditionals as Random Variables." In Ellery Eells, ed., Probability and Conditionals. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994.
"The Interaction of Modality with Quantification and Identity." In Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, ed., Modality, Morality, and Belief. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994.
"Letter to Brian Skyrms." In
Ellery Eells, and Brian Skyrms. eds.,
Probability and Conditionals: Belief Revision and Rational Decision.
Cambridge Studies in Probability, Induction, and Decision Theory.
Cambridge & New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994.
"Essays on Probability and Conditionals
is intended to honor Professor Ernest W. Adams."
"On the Evaluation of Solution Concepts." Theory and Decision (July 1994), 37(1):49-73.
"The Interaction of Modality with Quantification and Identity." In Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Diana Raffman, and Nicholas Asher, eds., Modality, Morality, and Belief: Essays in Honor of Ruth Barcan Marcus. Cambridge & New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995.
"Knowledge, Belief and Counterfactual Reasoning in Games." Economics and Philosophy (October 1996), 12(2):133-163.
"On a Defense of the Hegemony of Representation." In Enrique Villanueva, ed., Perception. Atascadero: Ridgeview, 1996.
"On the Representation of Context." Proceedings from Semantics and Linguistic Theory (1996), 6:279-294.
"On What Possible Worlds Could Not Be." In Adam Morton, ed., Benacerraf and his Critics. Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell, 1996.
"Pragmatics." In Heimir Geirsson and Michael Losonsky, eds., Readings in Language and Mind, pp. 77-88. Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell, 1996.
"Varieties of Supervenience." In James E. Tomberlin, ed., Metaphysics, 1996, pp. 221-241. Philosophical Perspectives (1996), 10. A supplement to Noûs (1996). Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell, 1996.
"Belief Revision in Games: Forward and Backward Induction." Mathematical Social Sciences (July 1998), 36(1):31-56.
"Los nombres y la referencia: semantica y metasemantica." Teorema (1998), 17(1):7-19.
"On the Representation of Context." Journal of Logic, Language and Information (1998), 7(1):3-19.
"Reference and Necessity." In Bob Hale and Crispin Wright, eds., A Companion to the Philosophy of Language, pp. 534-554. Blackwell Companions to Philosophy. Oxford & Malden, Mass.: Blackwell, 1998.
"Replies to Comments." In Enrique Villanueva, ed., Concepts. Philosophical Issues (1998), 9. Atascadero: Ridgeview, 1998.
"Response to Bonanno and Nehring."
Theory and Decision (December 1998), 45(3):297-299.
See their "On Stalnaker's Notion of Strong
Rationalizability and Nash
Equilibrium
in
Perfect Information Games" below under "Discussions on Stalnaker."
Review of M.J. Cresswell's Language in the World. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (March 1998), 58(1):241-244.
"What Might Nonconceptual Content Be?" In Enrique Villanueva, ed., Concepts. Philosophical Issues (1998), 9. Atascadero: Ridgeview, 1998.
(with Ned Block.) "Conceptual Analysis, Dualism, and the Explanatory Gap." Philosophical Review (January 1999), 108(1):1-46.
Context and Content: Essays on Intentionality in Speech and Thought.
Oxford Cognitive Science Series. Oxford & New York: Oxford University Press, 1999.
Includes "The Problem of Logical
Omniscience, II," pp. 255-273.
"Knowledge, Belief, and Counterfactual Reasoning in Games." In Cristina Bicchieri, Richard Jeffrey, and Brian Skyrms, eds., The Logic of Strategy. New York: Oxford University Press, 1999.
"On Moore's Paradox." In Pascal Engel, ed., Believing and Accepting. Philosophical Studies Series, 83. Dordrecht & Boston: Kluwer Academic, 2000.
Edited (with Alex Byrne and Ralph Wedgwood.) Fact and Value: Essays on Ethics and Metaphysics for Judith Jarvis Thomson. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, "A Bradford Book," 2001.
Reviews of Robert Stalnaker's Context and Content: Essays
on Intentionality in Speech and
Thought (1999)
Capone, Alessandro. Journal of Linguistics (July 2000),
36(2):454-455.
Caton, Charles E. "Stalnaker on Pragmatic Presupposition." In Peter Cole, ed., Radical Pragmatics, pp. 83-100. New York: Academic Press, 1981.
Hanson, William H. "Indicative Conditionals are Truth-functional." Mind (January 1991), 100(397):53-72.
Hardegree, Gary M. "Stalnaker Conditionals and Quantum Logic." Journal of Philosophical Logic (November 1975), 4(4):399-421.
Harper, William. "A Note on Universal Instantiation in the Stalnaker Thomason Conditional Logic and M Type Modal Systems." Journal of Philosophical Logic (October 1974), 3(4):372-379.
Kvart, Igal. A Theory of Counterfactuals. Indianapolis: Hackett, 1986.
Palau, Gladys. "Condicionales Contrafácticos: Condiciones de verdad y semántica de mundos posibles. Acerca de las Teorías de R. Stalnaker y D. Lewis." Critica (April 1980), 12(34):5-.
Pendlebury, Michael. "The Projection Strategy and the Truth Conditions of Conditional Statements." Mind (April 1989), 98(390):179-205.
Perry, John. "From Worlds to Situations." Journal of Philosophical Logic (1986), 15:83-107.
Pizzi, Claudio. "Stalnaker-Lewis Conditionals: Three Grades of Holistic Involvment." Logique et Analyse (September-December 1990), 33(131-132):311-329.
Rehder, W. "Glimpses of the Disastrous Invasion of Philosophy by Logic." Logique et Analyse (1983), 26:227-239.
Tichy, Pavel. "A Counterexample to the Stalnaker-Lewis Analysis of Counterfactuals." Philosophical Studies (April 1976), 29(4):271-273.
Williamson, Timothy. "Bivalence and Subjunctive Conditionals." Synthese (1988), 75:405-421.