Department of Philosophy
(with Owen Flanagan.) "Zombies and the Function of Consciousness." Journal of Consciousness Studies (1995), 2(4):313-321.
(with Owen Flanagan.) "Natural Answers to Natural Questions." In
Valerie Gray Hardcastle, ed., Where Biology Meets Psychology: Philosophical
Essays, pp. 221-247. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, A Bradford Book,
1999.
Abstract:
"The authors illustrate a way that biology and psychology can inform
and transform philosophy of mind. They are concerned with how a process of
reflective equilibrium among the special sciences could answer
philosophical questions about mind. To demonstrate the value of their
approach, they taxonomize the philosophical issues concerning the nature
and status of consciousness and point to where biology or psychology will
be useful in answering the questions. They also discuss the function and
place of consciousness in cognition. In this chapter we consolidate and elaborate on our earlier work to show
how the natural method, the method of seeking reflective equilibrium from
psychology, neuroscience, and phenomenology, can lead to progress on the
central questions about consciousness."
"Natural Minds." Ph.D. Dissertation in Philosophy, Duke University, 1999.
(with Dale Purves and Beau Lotto.) "Color Vision and the Four-Color-Map Problem."
Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience (March 2000), 12(2):233-237.
Abstract: "Suggests that humans perceive four-color categories defined by unique
hues because the visual system has evolved to solve a fundamental problem
in topology, namely ensuring that no two areas separated by a common
boundary in a two-dimensional array will appear the same if they are
actually different. In topology, this issue is generally referred to as
the "four-color-map problem." Four different colors are needed to make
maps that avoid adjacent countries of the same color. Because the retinal
image is two dimensional, like a map, four dimensions of chromatic
experience would also be needed to optimally distinguish regions returning
spectrally different light to the eye. The authors therefore suggest that
the organization of human color vision according to four-color classes
(reds, greens, blues, and yellows) has arisen as a solution to this
logical requirement in topology. It was concluded that the hypothesis that
the human color vision solves a fundamental problem in topology provides a
novel way of thinking about an otherwise perplexing feature of color
experience, namely why we see four categories of color, each defined by a
unique hue."
(with Dale Purves and Beau Lotto.) "Untitled - Reply."
Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience (September 2000), 12(5):911.
Reply to E.L. Schwartz and M. Cohen. "Untitled - Commentary."
Review of Jaegwon Kim Mind in a Physical World: An Essay on the Mind-Body Problem and Mental Causation. Philosophical Psychology (March 2000), 13(1):135-139.
"Zombies." In Marco Nani and Massimo Marraffa, eds., Field Guide to the Philosophy of Mind. Società Italiana Filosofia Analitica, 2000.
"Zombies Explained." In Don Ross, Andrew Brook, and David Thompson, eds., Dennett's Philosophy: A Comprehensive Assessment, pp. 259-286. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, A Bradford Book, 2000.
"Consciousness, Adaptation and Epiphenomenalism." In James Fetzer, ed., Conscioussness Evolving. Amsterdam: Benjamins, 2001.
"A Critical Commentary on Dennett's Brainchildren. Philosophical Psychology.
(with Owen Flanagan.) "A Decade of Teleofunctionalism: Lycan's Consciousness and Consciousness and Experience. Minds and Machines (2001), 15(1):1-14.
"Consciousness, Function of." In Lynn Nadel, ed., Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science. London: Macmillan Reference.