UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA IRVINE
DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY
COLLOQUIUM
"Ryle on Sensation and the Origin of the Identity
Theory"
Abstract:
"Contemporary physicalist theories of mind descend from
the identity theory of Place, Smart, and Feigl;but
the
first articulations of the identity theory
themselves
partially originated in a misunderstanding of
Ryle's
conceptual explanation of mind and consciousness. An
analysis of Ryle's project in early articles and in
The
Concept of Mind shows that Ryle was not a logical
behaviorist and that he did not intend to analyze
sensation-terms as referring to internal
dispositions. On
the other hand, one of the objections the early
identity
theorists brought against Ryle - that his theory could
not
capture the reporting use of sensation-terms - does
expose a substantial and historically significant
weakness
in Ryle's account of sensation. This suggests a
re-thinking of our reasons for accepting
theoretical
descendants of the identity theory, but also
suggests
that the immediacy of sensation poses deep problems
for
any suggested "grammatical" or "conceptual" analysis
of
it."
Paul Livingston
Department of Philosophy
University of California, Irvine
Friday, January 25, 2002
3 pm
HOB2 233
Paul Livingston